Refreshing Analysis on Russia-USA

The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy

Preface: Reading the media reports on the Georgia/Russia conflict is frought with bias traps from all perspectives. Parsing the bias to a minimum and analysing the strategic options of all players remains the best chance to understand the geopolitical context in which we find ourselves. I have posted this article as it delineates clearly the critical aspects which must be addressed by all parties in the future. Enjoy.

September 2, 2008
By George Friedman
The United States has been fighting a war in the Islamic world since 2001. Its main theaters of operation are in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its politico-military focus spreads throughout the Islamic world, from Mindanao to Morocco. The situation on Aug. 7, 2008, was as follows:

1. The war in Iraq was moving toward an acceptable but not optimal solution. The government in Baghdad was not pro-American, but neither was it an Iranian puppet, and that was the best that could be hoped for. The United States anticipated pulling out troops, but not in a disorderly fashion.
2. The war in Afghanistan was deteriorating for the United States and NATO forces. The Taliban was increasingly effective, and large areas of the country were falling to its control. Force in Afghanistan was insufficient, and any troops withdrawn from Iraq would have to be deployed to Afghanistan to stabilize the situation. Political conditions in neighboring Pakistan were deteriorating, and that deterioration inevitably affected Afghanistan.
3. The United States had been locked in a confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program, demanding that Tehran halt enrichment of uranium or face U.S. action. The United States had assembled a group of six countries (the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) that agreed with the U.S. goal, was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and had agreed at some point to impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran failed to comply. The United States was also leaking stories about impending air attacks on Iran by Israel or the United States if Tehran didn’t abandon its enrichment program. The United States had the implicit agreement of the group of six not to sell arms to Tehran, creating a real sense of isolation in Iran.

* The Russian Resurgence

In short, the United States remained heavily committed to a region stretching from Iraq to Pakistan, with main force committed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the possibility of commitments to Pakistan (and above all to Iran) on the table. U.S. ground forces were stretched to the limit, and U.S. airpower, naval and land-based forces had to stand by for the possibility of an air campaign in Iran — regardless of whether the U.S. planned an attack, since the credibility of a bluff depended on the availability of force.

The situation in this region actually was improving, but the United States had to remain committed there. It was therefore no accident that the Russians invaded Georgia on Aug. 8 following a Georgian attack on South Ossetia. Forgetting the details of who did what to whom, the United States had created a massive window of opportunity for the Russians: For the foreseeable future, the United States had no significant forces to spare to deploy elsewhere in the world, nor the ability to sustain them in extended combat. Moreover, the United States was relying on Russian cooperation both against Iran and potentially in Afghanistan, where Moscow’s influence with some factions remains substantial. The United States needed the Russians and couldn’t block the Russians. Therefore, the Russians inevitably chose this moment to strike.

On Sunday, Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev in effect ran up the Jolly Roger. Whatever the United States thought it was dealing with in Russia, Medvedev made the Russian position very clear. He stated Russian foreign policy in five succinct points, which we can think of as the Medvedev Doctrine (and which we see fit to quote here):

* First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
* Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
* Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
* Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
* Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors.

Medvedev concluded, “These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy. As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”

The second point in this doctrine states that Russia does not accept the primacy of the United States in the international system. According to the third point, while Russia wants good relations with the United States and Europe, this depends on their behavior toward Russia and not just on Russia’s behavior. The fourth point states that Russia will protect the interests of Russians wherever they are — even if they live in the Baltic states or in Georgia, for example. This provides a doctrinal basis for intervention in such countries if Russia finds it necessary.

The fifth point is the critical one: “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.” In other words, the Russians have special interests in the former Soviet Union and in friendly relations with these states. Intrusions by others into these regions that undermine pro-Russian regimes will be regarded as a threat to Russia’s “special interests.”

Thus, the Georgian conflict was not an isolated event — rather, Medvedev is saying that Russia is engaged in a general redefinition of the regional and global system. Locally, it would not be correct to say that Russia is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union or the Russian empire. It would be correct to say that Russia is creating a new structure of relations in the geography of its predecessors, with a new institutional structure with Moscow at its center. Globally, the Russians want to use this new regional power — and substantial Russian nuclear assets — to be part of a global system in which the United States loses its primacy.

These are ambitious goals, to say the least. But the Russians believe that the United States is off balance in the Islamic world and that there is an opportunity here, if they move quickly, to create a new reality before the United States is ready to respond. Europe has neither the military weight nor the will to actively resist Russia. Moreover, the Europeans are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas supplies over the coming years, and Russia can survive without selling it to them far better than the Europeans can survive without buying it. The Europeans are not a substantial factor in the equation, nor are they likely to become substantial.

This leaves the United States in an extremely difficult strategic position. The United States opposed the Soviet Union after 1945 not only for ideological reasons but also for geopolitical ones. If the Soviet Union had broken out of its encirclement and dominated all of Europe, the total economic power at its disposal, coupled with its population, would have allowed the Soviets to construct a navy that could challenge U.S. maritime hegemony and put the continental United States in jeopardy. It was U.S. policy during World Wars I and II and the Cold War to act militarily to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian landmass. For the United States, this was the most important task throughout the 20th century.

The U.S.-jihadist war was waged in a strategic framework that assumed that the question of hegemony over Eurasia was closed. Germany’s defeat in World War II and the Soviet Union’s defeat in the Cold War meant that there was no claimant to Eurasia, and the United States was free to focus on what appeared to be the current priority — the defeat of radical Islamism. It appeared that the main threat to this strategy was the patience of the American public, not an attempt to resurrect a major Eurasian power.

The United States now faces a massive strategic dilemma, and it has limited military options against the Russians. It could choose a naval option, in which it would block the four Russian maritime outlets, the Sea of Japan and the Black, Baltic and Barents seas. The United States has ample military force with which to do this and could potentially do so without allied cooperation, which it would lack. It is extremely unlikely that the NATO council would unanimously support a blockade of Russia, which would be an act of war.

But while a blockade like this would certainly hurt the Russians, Russia is ultimately a land power. It is also capable of shipping and importing through third parties, meaning it could potentially acquire and ship key goods through European or Turkish ports (or Iranian ports, for that matter). The blockade option is thus more attractive on first glance than on deeper analysis.

More important, any overt U.S. action against Russia would result in counteractions. During the Cold War, the Soviets attacked American global interest not by sending Soviet troops, but by supporting regimes and factions with weapons and economic aid. Vietnam was the classic example: The Russians tied down 500,000 U.S. troops without placing major Russian forces at risk. Throughout the world, the Soviets implemented programs of subversion and aid to friendly regimes, forcing the United States either to accept pro-Soviet regimes, as with Cuba, or fight them at disproportionate cost.

In the present situation, the Russian response would strike at the heart of American strategy in the Islamic world. In the long run, the Russians have little interest in strengthening the Islamic world — but for the moment, they have substantial interest in maintaining American imbalance and sapping U.S. forces. The Russians have a long history of supporting Middle Eastern regimes with weapons shipments, and it is no accident that the first world leader they met with after invading Georgia was Syrian President Bashar al Assad. This was a clear signal that if the U.S. responded aggressively to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Moscow would ship a range of weapons to Syria — and far worse, to Iran. Indeed, Russia could conceivably send weapons to factions in Iraq that do not support the current regime, as well as to groups like Hezbollah. Moscow also could encourage the Iranians to withdraw their support for the Iraqi government and plunge Iraq back into conflict. Finally, Russia could ship weapons to the Taliban and work to further destabilize Pakistan.

At the moment, the United States faces the strategic problem that the Russians have options while the United States does not. Not only does the U.S. commitment of ground forces in the Islamic world leave the United States without strategic reserve, but the political arrangements under which these troops operate make them highly vulnerable to Russian manipulation — with few satisfactory U.S. counters.

The U.S. government is trying to think through how it can maintain its commitment in the Islamic world and resist the Russian reassertion of hegemony in the former Soviet Union. If the United States could very rapidly win its wars in the region, this would be possible. But the Russians are in a position to prolong these wars, and even without such agitation, the American ability to close off the conflicts is severely limited. The United States could massively increase the size of its army and make deployments into the Baltics, Ukraine and Central Asia to thwart Russian plans, but it would take years to build up these forces and the active cooperation of Europe to deploy them. Logistically, European support would be essential — but the Europeans in general, and the Germans in particular, have no appetite for this war. Expanding the U.S. Army is necessary, but it does not affect the current strategic reality.

This logistical issue might be manageable, but the real heart of this problem is not merely the deployment of U.S. forces in the Islamic world — it is the Russians’ ability to use weapons sales and covert means to deteriorate conditions dramatically. With active Russian hostility added to the current reality, the strategic situation in the Islamic world could rapidly spin out of control.

The United States is therefore trapped by its commitment to the Islamic world. It does not have sufficient forces to block Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union, and if it tries to block the Russians with naval or air forces, it faces a dangerous riposte from the Russians in the Islamic world. If it does nothing, it creates a strategic threat that potentially towers over the threat in the Islamic world.

The United States now has to make a fundamental strategic decision. If it remains committed to its current strategy, it cannot respond to the Russians. If it does not respond to the Russians for five or 10 years, the world will look very much like it did from 1945 to 1992. There will be another Cold War at the very least, with a peer power much poorer than the United States but prepared to devote huge amounts of money to national defense.

There are four broad U.S. options:

1. Attempt to make a settlement with Iran that would guarantee the neutral stability of Iraq and permit the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces there. Iran is the key here. The Iranians might also mistrust a re-emergent Russia, and while Tehran might be tempted to work with the Russians against the Americans, Iran might consider an arrangement with the United States — particularly if the United States refocuses its attentions elsewhere. On the upside, this would free the U.S. from Iraq. On the downside, the Iranians might not want —or honor — such a deal.
2. Enter into negotiations with the Russians, granting them the sphere of influence they want in the former Soviet Union in return for guarantees not to project Russian power into Europe proper. The Russians will be busy consolidating their position for years, giving the U.S. time to re-energize NATO. On the upside, this would free the United States to continue its war in the Islamic world. On the downside, it would create a framework for the re-emergence of a powerful Russian empire that would be as difficult to contain as the Soviet Union.
3. Refuse to engage the Russians and leave the problem to the Europeans. On the upside, this would allow the United States to continue war in the Islamic world and force the Europeans to act. On the downside, the Europeans are too divided, dependent on Russia and dispirited to resist the Russians. This strategy could speed up Russia’s re-emergence.
4. Rapidly disengage from Iraq, leaving a residual force there and in Afghanistan. The upside is that this creates a reserve force to reinforce the Baltics and Ukraine that might restrain Russia in the former Soviet Union. The downside is that it would create chaos in the Islamic world, threatening regimes that have sided with the United States and potentially reviving effective intercontinental terrorism. The trade-off is between a hegemonic threat from Eurasia and instability and a terror threat from the Islamic world.

We are pointing to very stark strategic choices. Continuing the war in the Islamic world has a much higher cost now than it did when it began, and Russia potentially poses a far greater threat to the United States than the Islamic world does. What might have been a rational policy in 2001 or 2003 has now turned into a very dangerous enterprise, because a hostile major power now has the option of making the U.S. position in the Middle East enormously more difficult.

If a U.S. settlement with Iran is impossible, and a diplomatic solution with the Russians that would keep them from taking a hegemonic position in the former Soviet Union cannot be reached, then the United States must consider rapidly abandoning its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and redeploying its forces to block Russian expansion. The threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was far graver than the threat posed now by the fragmented Islamic world. In the end, the nations there will cancel each other out, and militant organizations will be something the United States simply has to deal with. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but the clock appears to have run out on the American war in the Islamic world.

We do not expect the United States to take this option. It is difficult to abandon a conflict that has gone on this long when it is not yet crystal clear that the Russians will actually be a threat later. (It is far easier for an analyst to make such suggestions than it is for a president to act on them.) Instead, the United States will attempt to bridge the Russian situation with gestures and half measures.

Nevertheless, American national strategy is in crisis. The United States has insufficient power to cope with two threats and must choose between the two. Continuing the current strategy means choosing to deal with the Islamic threat rather than the Russian one, and that is reasonable only if the Islamic threat represents a greater danger to American interests than the Russian threat does. It is difficult to see how the chaos of the Islamic world will cohere to form a global threat. But it is not difficult to imagine a Russia guided by the Medvedev Doctrine rapidly becoming a global threat and a direct danger to American interests.

We expect no immediate change in American strategic deployments — and we expect this to be regretted later. However, given U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to the Caucasus region, now would be the time to see some movement in U.S. foreign policy. If Cheney isn’t going to be talking to the Russians, he needs to be talking to the Iranians. Otherwise, he will be writing checks in the region that the U.S. is in no position to cash.

www.stratfor.com

Lucid Comments - Georgia

The comments section after an article is for me the most honest indicator of the bias of the publisher. In comments, one can see the type of readers using the site, their intelligence and level of analysis. Also, other aspects not included in the article are brought to light, including critical insights.

On occasion I learn much more about a subject from the comments, than from the original article. Below, I have posted some uniquely lucid comments found while reading background material on the Georgia-Russia conflict. http://www.newstatesman.com/europe/2008/08/georgia-russia-ukraine-cheney

Of course, these comments are chosen through my own bias.

taghioff.info
14 August 2008 at 13:49

I am sure the EU must take a very, very dim view of the US playing electoral poker in its vicinity.

Is this not a very good reason that the EU should have its own military force and own military alliance apart from NATO, since its interests, in terms of defence, now diverge so strongly from those of the US?

Surely Georgia and the Ukraine are countries that one day might join the EU (though probably not very soon) so American intervention here is ultimately very destabilising for Europe.

The other option is for the EU to ask for NATO to be put under control of the UN Security council, but with no countervailing military power in the world, pigs will fly before that happens...

writeon
15 August 2008 at 17:13

There are some very "interesting" and telling attitudes revealed in some of the above comments towards the inhabitants of South Ossetia, which verge close to something very unpleasant indeed and explain how a regime that purports to embrace freedom and democracy and respect for human rights, can launch such a brutal and deadly attack against it's own people.

This is because the people being bombed and bombarded in South Ossetia aren't really "true" Georgians at all, they are legally foreigners, with no right to self-determination within Georgia or settle there, only in Russia, because they are aliens!

Apart from the absurdity of this kind of argument and it's almost total lack of any real foundation in international law relating to the treatment and status of ethnic minorities, it's also morally repugnant. That people who have lived in a region for centuries can suddenly be arbitrarily defined as "alien" and unwanted, and that this then is used as justification for bombing them, reminds one of some of the darkest periods in European history.

The Caucasus in a patchwork quilt of differing peoples. Peoples with there own histories, languages, cultures, songs, myths, poetry, heroes and illusions. It's also an region where rival empires have confronted each other for thousands of years, much like the Balkans.

This rich cultural tapestry should be a source of pride and strength, but these cultural and etnic differences can also easily exploited and perverted by unscrupulous politicians, which light the torch of nationalism not to lighten our way in the darkness, but as a weapon to burn down the homes of the "others".

At the same time as they use, abuse and prostitute national symbols and feelings, they also make power grabs that have distinct aims, mostly robbing their own ethnic group that they say they care so much about. Nationalism seems to be cover story designed to obscure the fact that they are robbing the treasury and steeped in corruption.

Who really gains from the fighting and destruction? It certainly isn't the ordinary people, who are duped into believing, and killing and dying, for a myth or an illusion, the myth of the pure nation state where one can be "free" and the others, those who one believes are responsible for all ones woes, have been excluded, dominated or "taken care of" in some other way.

Perhaps the biggest lie of the last hundred years, certainly the bloodiest, and most dangerous, has been the lie about the importance of "blood" and "land" and the illusion that the creation of an ethnically "pure" state was the answer to all ones problems. Just give us our own country, no matter how small, no matter the cost in blood and destruction, and the land of milk and honey is just around the corner. What childish rubbish! Only an idiot or a person totally lacking in knowledge could believe such a fairytale. Yet people are fed this nationalist nonsense, over and over again, by corrupt leaders, and they die and kill for a lie.

Nationalism isn't a blessing, it's a curse, and we've had way too much of it in Europe. We've almost drowned in rivers of blood, and for what exactly? For whose real benefit and profit? Certainly not the unhappy dead!

Fortunately in Western Europe, finally after so much war, slaughter and wasteful destruction, we appear to have tamed the monster of brute nationalism. We didn't have much choice as we'd almost destroyed ourselves in two terrible, barbaric and insane wars.

It would be tragic if the people in the Caucasus learnt nothing from our suffering and history. First one has to reject unconditionally the use of violence and military force to settle ethnic differences on all sides, and people have learn to negotiate and compromise. What they can't be allowed to do is go to war. Instead of the great powers selling arms and training new armies in Georgia and elsewhere, they should do the opposite. Fighting wars should be made as difficult as possible and economic sanctions should be imposed on any country that uses violence to compel any ethnic group to remain part of a central state.

My personal feeling is that the United States is using Georgia for its own purposes and doesn't give a damn about the Georgian people or how much they suffer or bleed. The US government doesn't care about "democracy" or "freedom" for the Georgian people, God they don't even care about these things for their own people in the United States, so why would they care about foreigners? The Americans want Georgia as a stepping-stone or military base on their way towards the energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, nothing more. The ordinary Georgians mean nothing to men like Bush. The Georgians have value only as long as they serve a usful purpose for the American ruling elite. This is the harsh truth about the nature of imperialism and how great powers regard their vassal states. Pawns have little value in the Great Game. The sooner the people of Georgia realise this and learn to live together imperfectly, the better in will be for them.

ikotubo
14 August 2008 at 13:59

Mr Gleny's article demonstrates the dangers we all face when power is given to a bunch of lunatics and ideological fantasists - even in a so-called democracy like the United States.

Douglas Chalmers
14 August 2008 at 17:24

The West, or rather the USA and its neocon lapdogs, has pretended that some kind of old Cold War tank battle could be fought and won and that would be the end of it. Forget it!

Treating Russia like another Iran or Pakistan is buying trouble. America has been doing that since 9/11 but the NATO countries are having to 'take delivery', uhh. Half of Europe will freeze in the dark this winter if they don't learn to be polite.

The days of gunboat diplomacy and forcing terms of trade onto others is now over. Russia has aligned itself with China and India and the Shanghai Co-operation Group will supersede the IMF, etc etc. The balance of power has shifted along to the side of USA's creditors.

'taghioff.info' makes an interesting point about the EU but they have actually been following an expansionists agenda themselves for some time. They must give up their dreams and illusions about their missile shields too. Being friendly with your neighbors is important.

With global warming and climate change upon us, continuing to play the old "great game" of Machiavellian politics is childish when more extensive co-operation is needed. Fighting over shrinking resources is also fatal in the nuclear age.

The West can't just pretend that Georgia is another Tibet and rant and rave endlessly. Both are dishonest and ploys to continue the illusions of faded empire and delusions of the now spent "American century". International affairs can no longer be entrusted to the thugs and crooks of the world's military-industrial complexes.

Sasha
15 August 2008 at 07:52

Message form Russia.

I'm russia nad really proud that at alst we kicked this fu..r Saakashvili ass, belive me everyone hates him in giogjia and you know why. I'll tell you. Giorgia is for 99% percent is Christians only 1% are muslims, so he represents this very small group of people, he is a muslim.... all those electionsthat there were are totall fake.. lots of places for elections never at all were opened esprsially far away from Tbilissi..

Russia becomes stronger and stronger and 99% in russia very happy about that.

writeon
15 August 2008 at 21:46

This legalistic approach is tangentally interesting and mildly entertaining, but hardly relevant to the current situation on the ground. It reminds me of the endless debates in the medieval church about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin, or whether Jesus Christ was an aristocrat or a commoner.

In the world we live in now, since the destruction of Yogoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the neutering of the United Nations; there really is no international law left standing that's any use anymore. When one systematically shreds and shows contempt for international law, as the United States has done repeatedly, one can hardly appeal to international law without raising howls of laughter. Even the Americans, who think of themselves as exceptional, cannot have it both ways, but of course this is what they demand. They want to dictate and define what parts of international law apply in various circumstances, and they reserve the right to pick and choose which parts international law are "relevant", only that international law doesn't apply to them and cannot be used against them. The hypocracy and double-standards involved in this perverse attitude are obvious and absurd.

The point is that powerful nations, great powers can really do whatever they want regardless of international law, this is the reality of the situation. The entire concept of international law, is in itself, highly debatable and controversial. Today, international law is a device used by powerful countries to punish weaker countries and stigmatize them for propaganda purposes.

For example, it is almost impossible to contemplate the United States allowing one of it's generals or politicians to be tride for their various war-crimes and crimes against humanity, even though there is a veritible mountain of evidence against them, such trials are for the weak and the vanquished, not the powerful and strong.

You go into great detail in relation to the law yet your interpretation of Georgian law is highly debatable and interpreted in partisan fashion which wouldn't stand up to qualified rebuttal in a court of law, something I have no intention of getting into here.

You do seem, in my opinion, to illustrate an attitude towards the people of South Ossetia which is disturbing in its implications. You mean that they have voluntarily chosen to change their nationality and alligance and consequently have not rights, human or otherwise inside Georgia anymore, that they have almost become outlaws with all that implies.

I've questioned your interpretation of Georgian law, which I find flawed and illogical, your partisan twisting and interpretation of international law in relation to the rights of ethnic minorities of whatever nationality, is even more problematic and just plain wrong, though it is, perhaps unintentionally, highly informative.

My main point is that the hapless Georgian people have been led towards disaster by a crazed and corrupt ultra-nationalist gang, who are basically puppets of the Americans, who couldn't care less about what happens to the Georgians as long as they are usful in their struggle with Russia. What's ironic is the gang in charge of Georgia are backing the wrong horse. The United States is an empire that is on it's way down, whilst Russia is a power with a future. When the United States is finished with Georgia it wil be abandoned like a used Kleenex.

writeon
16 August 2008 at 08:51

MichaelP.

In the words of a famous proverb; you can't see the wood for the trees.

Great and powerful nations, like people, do not generally observe laws that constrain their actions and interests. They use the "laws" as they see fit. International law is really a system of conventions that nations agree, up to a certain level, to abide by.

The Big Problem currently is that the United States has systematically undermined international law, a whole raft of treaties, demands exceptonal treatment for itself, and has emasculated the United Nations. The United States has also become a very and openly agressive state, ready to invade weaker states to pursue its national interests. One can substitute the words "freedom 'n' democracy" for "oil and gas" and that is basically the rationale behind their actions.

What this means is that the entire structure of international law has been undermined and has lost the minimal importance it had. Clearly other nations have watched and learnt from the Americans. The Russians certainly have. The American idea that they can dictate and define what international law is and who has to obey it, is, hypocritical, absurd, arrogant and counter-productive.

The current crazed gang which is leading Georgia towards disaster, seems to believe it can turn Georgia into a valuable and indispensible ally of the United States, similar to Israel. I believe this is a fundamental miscaculation and mistake which the Georgian people are going to pay a very high price for, whilst the leadership will go into exile and enjoy their millions in the sun.

writeon
16 August 2008 at 15:32

Mostly I feel sorry for the ordinary people in the Caucasus and Georgia who are caught-up in a deadly "game" between great powers, like two monsterous devils playing chess with real people on the board.

The Georgian people are being used by the Bush administration, and the Georgian government is perfectly content to allow their people to suffer, die, bleed and serve the interests of a foreign power. This I would argue is really a form of high treason or treachery, serving a foreign government before one's own people. But then this is the traditional role of the vassal state leader, to betray his own and serve his imperial master. Some of these "leaders" so stupid and ignorant of the obscene game they are merely pawns in, that they appear to actually believe their own nationalist rhetoric, that they are saving their countries, whilst in reality they are leading them towards disaster and destruction.

writeon
16 August 2008 at 17:48

While I'm at it perhaps the "pawns" in the game would be better off breaking out of their allotted roles and chalenging the very "rules" of the game itself? Given the utter contempt their, oh so patriotic, leaders really have for them, maybe they should rise up like a mighty wind, and instead of killing each other turn their anger on their real enemies, their masters, sitting way behind the lines, manipulating, pulling the strings, making all the money. Smash the board, wipe out the squares, turned the whole damn thing over and start again!

writeon
17 August 2008 at 22:06

Countries, states, great powers, are not people, they don't have "friends". Turkey is not a "friend" of Georgia and will not be using its large army to help its little "friend" against the big, bad, bully to the north.

Great powers don't have permanent friends, they have only have permanent interests, and their own interests come first. Great powers use smaller nations and when they no longer find them useful, they are caste aside. Empires as large, rich and powerful, like the United States, don't have "allies", they don't need them. What they have is states that serve their interests to varying degrees or one doesn't, then one is effectively the enemy of the United States and then one had better watch out.

The world functions pretty much like the movie "The Godfather" only on a even bloodier and bigger, global scale. For centuries the West, in its accendancy, has resembled a group of Mafia families carving up "territory" between them.

The European Union is an attempt to replace the rival Mafia clan model with something else, to stop them launching eternal "turf wars" over territory, wars that risk burning everything down so there is nothing left of any value to fight over anymore.

Russian tanks are not going to role over the borders of Germany heading for the English Channel, not only would this be insane, it would, more importantly, be unproductive and unprofitable. Who would then buy Russia's oil and gas? It makes no sense for kill one's best customer. Why bother to take over Western Europe with tanks when one can just buy it?

Germany is building a longterm strategic alliance with Russia not confronting Russia. In the last couple of years alone German exports to Russia have boomed, Russia is now one of Germany's best markets. The Russians have the money and Germany has the manufactured goods. The idea that Germany would sacrifice it's relationship to Russia for Georgia is ridiculous. This is not the way the world works, at least not as long as one can keep the nationalist lunatics and their dangerous mythology under control, which is fundamentally what the European Union is all about.

Europe can become even wealthier and successful in an integrated economic partnership with - Russia, which has a vast storehouse of resources which we need. However, the United States doesn't want this mutually beneficial relationship to happen, because this will mean Power moving away from the United States and towards Europe and Russia.

The United States is trying to split Europe in two, it has mobilized it's most loyal vassal states; notably Great Britain, Poland, Georgia, in a cold war aimed at Russia, talk to people in Bruxelles in private, off the record, and they will tell the same basic story. A new cold war aimed at Russia isn't in Europe's interests, but it is in the interests of the United States. At least that's the attitude of powrful groups in the ruling elite, the most ignorant, the most nationalistic, the most dangerous.

The desire to confront Russia is also echoed in right-wing nationalist groups in some parts of Europe, though especially in "new europe". These groups don't have much else to sell but the nationalist myth and Russia is an easy target for them. But none of this has anything to do with democracy, or freedom or human rights. It's about power and wealth and who has it and who doesn't.

What's gratifying is that there are powerful elements in the European elite; in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Holland, Sweden, who realize what's happening and why, and have no intention of joining the American confrontation crusade against Russia. A crusade that will eventually lead to war. A war fought in Europe, wiping out Europe once and for all.